We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a public good and study which Nash equilibria are achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents. We investigate the coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that, under some incentive condition of agents, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine a coalition-proof equilibrium of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. In the participation game in the provision of a public good, the following situation is considered. There are one private and one public good in the economy, and the public good is produced from the private good.
There are n ≥ 2 agents, and these n agents simultaneously choose to either participate in the joint production of the public good or not. The agents that choose participation decide the level of public good and distribute the production cost of the public good according to some rules. The agents that choose non-participation can free-ride the public good that is provided by the participants. The participation game has been studied by several authors. By using this framework, Yamato (1999, 2008 ) and Shinohara (2009) studied a participation problem in efficient public good mechanisms, such as those presented by Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) . An important application of the participation game is the ratification game of international environmental agreements, which has been studied by Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) . Most of the preceding studies investigated a Nash equilibrium of the participation game.
Since these authors considered the case in which all agents have the same preference relations, the Nash equilibria of the participation game tend to have the same characteristic (e.g., the equilibrium number of participants; the equilibrium level of a public good) even if the Nash equilibria are multiple. However, when agents' preferences are heterogeneous, there may exist multiple Nash equilibria with different characteristics. In this paper, we consider the case of heterogeneous agents and address which Nash equilibria can be achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents by using a coalition-proof equilibrium, which was introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) . The coalition-proof equilibrium can be defined under two different notions of a dominance relation. One is strict domination, and the other is weak domination. A strategy profile of s T strictly dominates a strategy profile s T for a coalition T if all members of T can be better off by switching s T to s T . A strategy profile of s T weakly dominates a strategy profile s T for a coalition T if all members of T are not worse off and at least one member of T is better off by switching s T to s T . A coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination and that under strict domination do not necessarily intersect, as Konishi et al. (1999) pointed out. We examine these two notions of coalition-proof equilibria and clarify the relationship between Nash equilibria and coalition-proof equilibria for each dominance relation in this paper.
Our results are as follows: under the condition that relates to the participation incentives, which is called the preservation of participation incentives (Condition 1), we first show that a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium in the participation game. Second, every Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination. The condition of the preservation of participation incentives requires that, if agent i does not have an incentive to join in a set of participants P , then i does not have an incentive to join in a set of participants that produces more public goods than P . A Nash equilibrium is strict for non-participants if the non-participants at the equilibrium have a strict incentive to choose non-participation.
Several studies have investigated the relationship between Nash equilibria and coalition-proof equilibria, and the results in this paper cannot be derived from the results of earlier literature. Yi (1999) established sufficient conditions under which a strategy profile is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that no Nash equilibrium strictly Pareto-dominates. However, Yi (1999) focused only on a class of games in which the strategy space of each player is a subset of the real line and the payoff to each player depends on the sum of his opponents' strategies. This class of games contains the participation game only if agents' preferences are identical. Since agents in our model are heterogeneous, the participation game in this paper does not belong to this class. Thoron (1998) investigated coalition-proof equilibria under weak domination in a cartel-formation game, which is similar to the participation game. Thoron (1998) treated the case of identical agents and used a condition that differs from ours. Furusawa and Konishi (2008) examined a lobby-formation game, which is also similar to the participation game. They provided a characterization for the set of coalition-proof equilibria by using a subset of core allocations. Their result was different from ours. This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce the participation game and coalition-proof equilibrium under two dominance relations. Section 3 contains the basic properties of our model, and Section 4 contains the main results. In Section 5, we provide an application of our results. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 The model 2.1 A participation game in the provision of a public good
We consider the problem of providing a (pure) public good and distributing its cost.
There are one private and one public good in the economy. The level of the public good takes a non-negative real number. The set of agents is denoted by N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2. Each agent i ∈ N has a preference relation that is represented by a quasi-linear utility function. If y and x i designate the level of the public good and the transfer of the private good from agent i ∈ N , respectively, then agent i's utility In this paper, we consider a situation in which there is an opportunity for the joint production of a public good and each agent can decide either participation or nonparticipation in the joint production. The following two-stage game is considered.
In the first stage, each agent simultaneously decides whether or not to participate in the joint production. In the second stage, the agents who choose participation in the first stage jointly produce the public good and distribute the cost of producing the public good. Let P ⊆ N be a set of participants, and let (y P , (x P j ) j∈P ) be the outcome of the second stage when P is the set of participants. We assume that the ratio allocation introduced by Kaneko (1977a Kaneko ( , 1977b ) is achieved in the second stage.
Formally, y ∅ := 0, and, for every non-empty subset P of N , (y P , (x P j ) j∈P ) satisfies the following conditions:
We further assume that y P > 0 for every non-empty subset P of N . * 1
In this paper, we are not concerned with how the ratio allocation is attained in the second stage. However, if participants play the mechanisms constructed by Hurwicz (1979), Walker (1981) , and Corchon and Wilkie (1996) , then the ratio allocation can be accomplished in the equilibria of the mechanisms.
In this paper, we assume that agents that selected non-participation can benefit from the public good at no cost because of the non-excludability of the public good.
Assumption 1
For every set of participants P and for every agent i / ∈ P , x P i = 0, and i consumes y P .
Given the outcome of the second stage, the participation-decision stage can be reduced to the following simultaneous game. In the game, each agent i simultaneously chooses either s i = I (participation) or s i = O (non-participation), and then the set of participants is determined. Let P (s) := {i ∈ N | s i = I} be the set of participants at profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Then, each agent i obtains the utility
) at the action profile s. In other words, the participants produce the public good, and they share the cost of the public good as above. Each non-participant can benefit * 1 This assumption is not essential. In the case of y P = 0 for some non-empty subset P of N , if our discussion is applied to all Q with y Q > 0, the same conclusion can be obtained.
from the public good at no cost. We call this reduced game a participation game, which is formally defined as follows.
where U i is the payoff function of i, which associates a real number U i (s) with each strategy profile s ∈ S n : if P s designates the set of participants at s, then
) for all i.
We limit our attention to pure strategy profiles.
The definition of coalition-proof equilibria
A Nash equilibrium of a participation game is defined as usual.
Before introducing the notions of coalition-proof equilibria, we will introduce some Next, a coalition-proof equilibrium is introduced. It was introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) and is known as a refinement of Nash equilibria based on the stability against self-enforcing coalitional deviations. It is defined by using the notion of restricted games. A restricted game is a game in which a subset of agents plays the game G, taking the strategy profiles of agents outside the subset as given. We formally define it as follows. Let T N and t = #T . Let s N \T ∈ S n−t . A restricted game G|s N \T is a game in which the set of agents is T , the set of strategy profiles is S t , and the payoff function for each i ∈ T is the function 
• Let T ⊆ N with t = #T ≥ 2. Assume that coalition-proof equilibria under strict domination have been defined in restricted games G|s * N \Q for all Q T .
• Consider the restricted game G|s * N \T with t agents.
T is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination of G|s * N \T if it is a self-enforcing strategy profile under strict domination and there is no other self-enforcing strategy profile under strict
is defined inductively with respect to the number of agents t:
• Let T ⊆ N with t = #T ≥ 2. Assume that coalition-proof equilibria under weak domination have been defined in restricted games G|s * N \Q for all Q T .
Q is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination of G|s * N \Q .
-A strategy profile s * T is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination of G|s * N \T if it is a self-enforcing strategy profile under weak domination and there is no other self-enforcing strategy profile under weak 3 Basic properties of the participation game
Properties for payoff functions
We first introduce the payoff function that associates a real number with each set of participants.
is defined as follows:
For every set of participants P ,
Lemma 1 proves that the level of the public good gets higher as the size of sets of participants increases.
Lemma 1 For all sets of participants
The Proof is immediate.
Lemma 2 For all sets of participants P , Q ⊆ N , if y P > y Q ; then, conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied:
Proof. Condition (1) is trivial. We show (2). Let P, Q ⊆ N be such that
c(y) is maximized at y P for all i ∈ P . Hence, we have
Note that we have j∈P v j (y
We can also obtain
because
Therefore, we obtain from (4) 
Lemma 2 is a basic property for the payoff functions. From Lemma 2, the payoffs to participants and those to non-participants increase with the amount of the public good. This property will play an important role in showing the main results.
Nash equilibria and Pareto domination
First, two notions of Pareto domination are introduced.
Definition 5 (5.1) A strategy profile s ∈ S n weakly Pareto-dominates a strategy
Lemma 3 presents the relationship between a Nash equilibrium and the Pareto domination in the participation game.
Lemma 3
Let s ∈ S n be a Nash equilibrium. Then, s weakly Pareto-dominates every
Proof. Let s ∈ S n denote a Nash equilibrium, and let s ∈ S n be such that P ( s) P (s). It follows from Lemma 1 that y (2) , and the definition of the Nash equilibrium, we have the following three conditions:
Conditions (5) and (6) are immediate from y P (s) > y P (b s) , (1) and (2). The first inequality of (7) follows from the definition of Nash equilibrium, and the second follows from (1) and holds with strict inequality if P ( s) P (s)\{i}. By (5), (6) , and (7), the statements of Lemma 3 are proven.
Main results
We provide the main results under the following condition.
Condition 1 (Preservation of the participation incentive)
For all sets of par-
We can provide an interpretation for Condition 1 as follows. The increase of the amount of a public good does not change the non-participation incentive. For example, let Q ⊆ N and i ∈ Q with u i (Q\{i}) > u i (Q). Agent i has an incentive to withdraw from Q and free-ride a public good. Condition 1 says that agent i also wants to withdraw from every P that produces a public good more than y Q . Agent i
, who is indifferent between joining in and free-riding Q\{i}, has a strict incentive to withdraw from the provision of a public good if the level of the public good increases. Thus, once one agent has an incentive to non-participate in the provision of some amount y > 0 of a public good, this agent also non-participates in the provision of more than y units of the public good.
Characterization of coalition-proof equilibria under strict domination
We show that the set of coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination coincides with the weakly Pareto-efficient frontier of the set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1
In the participation game under Condition 1, a strategy profile is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that every Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Paretodominated by any other Nash equilibrium is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination. such that i / ∈ P ( s) or j ∈ P (s * ) for all j ∈ P ( s). Thus, we must consider the following two cases:
exist. In case (a), it follows from Lemma 3 that the deviation by D is not profitable.
In case (b), agent j switches from O to I by the deviation of D. The payoff to j before the deviation is u j (P (s * )) = v j (y P (s * ) ), and the payoff to j after the deviation
c(y P (e s) ). Since y P (s * ) ≥ y P (e s) , we have for some k ∈ P ( s). Notice that k ∈ D. Since the deviation by D is improving, we
. By the definition of the Nash equilibrium,
we must have y P (e s) > y
Hence, we have u k (P ( s)\{k}) > u k (P ( s)), which implies that s D is not a Nash equilibrium of G|s * −D . (End of Proof of Claim 2)
From Claim 1 and Claim 2, no coalitions can deviate; thus, the deviations are selfenforcing and improving. Consequently, every Nash equilibrium that is not strictly
Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination. From this, it follows that every Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium under strict domination is strictly Pareto-dominated by coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination. Thus, no Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium under strict domination is coalition-proof.T he intuition that no coalition can deviate profitably and self-enforceably from the weakly Pareto-efficient frontier of the set of Nash equilibria is as follows: from Lemma 2, the payoffs to agents are positively correlated with the amount of a public good.
Hence, if a coalition deviates in a way that reduces the amount of a public good, then some members of the coalition are worse off after the deviations. This is proved in Lemma 3 and Claim 1. Thus, a coalition must deviate jointly in such a way that the amount of a public good increases in order for the coalitional deviation to be improving. However, if a coalition deviates and raises the level of a public good, an agent j who chooses non-participation before the deviation needs to join in the deviation and switch non-participation to participation through this deviation. It follows from Condition 1 that agent j wants to switch participation to non-participation again after this coalitional deviation because the level of the public good rises. Thus, no deviation that increases the amount of a public good is a self-enforcing deviation. This is shown in Claim 2. This condition is satisfied in the participation game only when agents are identical.
Since our model allows for heterogeneous agents, Yi (1999)'s results cannot be applied to our model in order to characterize the set of coalition-proof equilibria under strict domination.
4.2
Relationship between a Nash equilibrium and a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination Konishi et al. (1999) pointed out that a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination and that under strict domination may assign different strategy profiles.
In this subsection, we provide a sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium to be a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination in the participation game and address which Nash equilibria are coalition-proof under weak domination.
Condition 2 (A strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants) A Nash equi-
Every non-participant at a Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants reduces his payoff if he deviates from this Nash equilibrium. Thus, the non-participants at the Nash equilibrium have a strict incentive to choose non-participation. The strictness for non-participants does not require participants' payoffs. At the strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants, the participants' payoffs may not change if the participants deviate from participation to non-participation.
We prove that every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination if Condition 1 holds in the participation game.
Proposition 2 Assume that Condition 1 holds. If s * is a Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants, then it is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination, and it is also a Nash equilibrium that is not weakly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
Assume that Condition 1 is satisfied. Let s * be a Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants. We show that s * is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak We can prove, similarly to Claim 1, that y P (e s) > y P (s * ) must be satisfied so that
. We obtain from (ii) that u i (P ( s)) ≥ u i (P (s * )) for this agent i. Since s * is a Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants, we have u i (P (s * )) > u i (P (s * ) ∪ {i}). Therefore, we have
It follows from (8) that y P (e s) > y P (s * )∪{i} . It follows from Condition 1 and the
We confirm from this inequality that s D
is not a Nash equilibrium of G|s * −D . It follows from these analyses that s * is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination in the participation game.
By substituting N for D in the proof above, we show that s * is a Nash equilibrium that is not weakly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium.T he intuition of Proposition 2 is almost the same as that of Proposition 1. The difference between Propositions 1 and 2 is that we must treat joint deviations in which at least one of the agents in a coalition is better off and the other members are not worse off in Proposition 2. If a Nash equilibrium is not strict for non-participants, then this Nash equilibrium may not be coalition-proof under weak domination for the following reason: let s ∈ S n denote a Nash equilibrium that is not strict for nonparticipants. Then, there exists i / ∈ P (s) such that u i (P (s)) = u i (P (s) ∪ {i}). That is, agent i is indifferent between participation and non-participation when agents in P (s) choose participation. Then, take agent j ∈ P (s) and consider a joint deviation by i and j, in which i deviates from non-participation to participation and j continues to choose participation. After this deviation, i and j receive payoffs u i (P (s)∪{i}) and u j (P (s) ∪ {i}), respectively. Notice that y P (s)∪{i} is more than y P (s) from Lemma 1 and u j (P (s) ∪ {i}) > u j (P (s)) from (2). However, nothing prevents the possibility
holds, then the deviation of {i, j} is self-enforcing under weak domination.
The following corollary is immediate from Proposition 2. From Proposition 2, it follows that, if a Nash equilibrium that is strict for nonparticipants exists, then it is coalition-proof under weak domination. This Nash equilibrium is also the one that is not weakly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium. Thus, from Proposition 1, this is also coalition-proof under strict domination. These results mean that, under Condition 1, coalition-proof equilibria under strict domination and weak domination intersect. Thoron (1998) examined the coalition-proof equilibria under weak domination of a cartel-formation game, which is similar to the participation game in a public good provision. In the cartel-formation game, each firm decides whether or not to join the cartel. Only the firms that join the cartel follow its agreements, and the other firms behave independently. The main differences between Thoron (1998) and this paper are as follows. First, Thoron (1998) considered a case in which every firm is identical, while this paper allows for the heterogeneity of agents. Second, the condition that is satisfied in Thoron (1998) Let P be a set of participants. Then, we obtain y P = j∈P α j 2
2
. The payoff functions to the participants and the non-participants are as follows: For all i ∈ N ,
It follows from (9) that
From (10), the Nash-equilibrium sets of participants are characterized as follows.
Lemma 4 A set of participants P ⊆ N is a Nash-equilibrium set of participants in the participation game if and only if P satisfies (i) j∈P \{i} α j ≤ α i for all i ∈ P and (ii) j∈P α j ≥ α i for all i / ∈ P .
Lemma 5
Let n ≥ 2. There is no Nash equilibrium in which more than two agents participate in the provision of a public good.
Proof.
Assume that there is a Nash equilibrium in which P with #P ≥ 3 is the set of participants. Then, we have α i ≥ j∈P \{i} α j for all i ∈ P . Summing up this inequality for all i ∈ P yields i∈P α i ≥ i∈P j∈P \{i} α j = (#P − 1) i∈P α i .
However, i∈P α i < (#P − 1) i∈P α i must be satisfied because #P ≥ 3. This is a contradiction.¨1
Proposition 3
In the participation game with n ≥ 3, there is a Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants.
Proof. First, consider the case in which arg max l∈N α l is singleton. If we designate {i} = arg max l∈N α l , then {i} is supported as a Nash equilibrium at which u j ({i}) > u j ({i, j}) for all j = i from (10) . Second, consider the case in which arg max l∈N α l is not singleton. If {i, j} ⊆ arg max l∈N α l , then {i, j} is attained at a Nash equilibrium at which u k ({i, j}) > u k ({i, j, k}) for all k = i, j from (10). Therefore, there is a Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants.Ẅ hen v i (y) = α i √ y with α i > 0 and c(y) = y, Condition 1 is satisfied. Let
Hence, it follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that (i) a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination and (ii) there are a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination and one under weak domination in this setting.
Finally, using the results in this subsection, we characterize the set of coalition-proof equilibria in the following example.
√ y with (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ) = (3, 3, 2, 2), and c(y) = y. We confirm from Lemma 4 that {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, and {3, 4} are supported as Nash equilibria. Table 1 represents the payoffs to agents at Nash equilibria. From this table, no Nash equilibrium dominates the other Nash equilibrium in the sense of strict Pareto domination. Hence, these four sets of participants can be supported as coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination. Since {1, 2} and {3, 4} are attained at strict Nash equilibria for non-participants, these two sets are supported as coalition-proof equilibria under weak domination. Sets {1} and {2} are not supportable as coalition-proof equilibria under weak domination.
Insert Table 1 here
In the case of n = 4, we need to consider one-agent games, two-agent games, three-agent games, and the whole game, in that order. Since there are four oneagent coalitions, six two-agent coalitions, and four three-agent coalitions in this case, it is time-consuming to identify the set of coalition-proof equilibria according to the definition of coalition-proof equilibria. However, from the results in this paper, we can characterize the set of coalition-proof equilibria by just checking Conditions 1 and 2.
Therefore, by applying these results, we can more easily characterize the equilibrium set of the participation game.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the coalition-proof equilibria of the participation game in the provision of a public good. First, we examined a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination. We proved that a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium in the participation game under Condition 1. Second, we also investigated a coalition-proof equilibrium that is based on weak domination. We showed that every Nash equilibrium that is strict for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination in the participation game under Condition 1. It follows from this result that a strict Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof under weak domination. Finally, we apply our results to the case in which agents have square-root benefit functions and the cost function of the public good is linear.
In general, it is difficult to identify a coalition-proof equilibrium in strategic form games because the definition of this equilibrium is recursive and is complicated. This applies even to simple games, such as the participation game studied in this paper.
The contribution in this paper is to clarify which Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof in the simple binary participation game under Condition 
